# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

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ALAN J. BEAUCHAMP,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	Case No. 1:05-cv-447
v.	)	Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,	) )	
Defendant.	) ) )	

### **OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint because the Michigan Department of Corrections is immune.

# **Discussion**

#### I. Factual allegations

Plaintiff currently is incarcerated in the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC). In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Plaintiff claims that he requires a special diet due to pre-existing medical conditions. Because IBC is not a diet designated facility, it does not provide "special" meals to prisoners. As a result, Plaintiff receives regular meals, as well as a supplemental snack bag. Plaintiff contends that the snack bag is insufficient to fulfill his dietary needs. For relief, he seeks a transfer to a facility that can satisfy his dietary and medical needs.

## II. Immunity

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, if the state has not waived immunity and Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. *See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); *O'Hara v. Wigginton*, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, *Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. *Abick v. Michigan*, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. *See*, *e.g.*, *Turnboe v. Stegall*, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at \*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000); *Erdman v. Michigan Dep't of Corr.*, No. 94-2109, 1995 WL 150341, at \*1 (6th Cir. April 5, 1995); *Cullens v. Bemis*, No.

92-1582, 1992 WL 337688, at \*1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1992); Adams v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No.

86-1803, 1987 WL 36006, at \*1 (6th Cir. May 7, 1987). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting

through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a "person" who may be sued under § 1983

for money damages. See Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Michigan

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Accordingly, the MDOC is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the

Court determines that Plaintiff's action must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), because the MDOC is immune.

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no

good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$255

appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is

barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is

barred, he will be required to pay the \$255 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Date: August 16, 2005

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell

ROBERT HOLMES BELL

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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